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What a Tangled Web We Weave:  
Conflicts in Rating Agency Liability 
 
Nicholas Hoggard

 
 
Of the many causes attributed to the credit crisis, few have received more attention 
than the role of credit rating agencies (CRAs). A small number of large CRAs 
dominate an industry whose judgement on the credit-worthiness of debt obligations 
informed the investment decisions of banks and investors the world over. In this 
paper, I consider the latest in a line of EU Regulations dealing with CRA. These 
regulations include Regulation (EU) 462/2013 of 21 May 2013 amending Regulation 
(EC) 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies [2013] OJ L146/1 (the Regulation). The 
Regulation imposes civil liability upon CRAs for causing loss to an investor by 
committing any of a significant number of infringements.
1
 
 
In part 1 of the paper, I submit that, while this civil liability replicates the existing UK 
law of deceit almost exactly, it is more restrictive than the law of deceit in that it 
requires the defendant’s reliance to be reasonable. In part 2, I consider that this 
divergence from the law of deceit is more than a mere trivialityit has both practical 
and legal implications. The practical implications arise from the global reach of 
English law in the debt markets. For example, English law governs more sovereign 
bonds than the law of any other country, and the majority of those bonds are listed 
outside of London and denominated in currencies other than sterling. The legal 
implications are two-fold.
2
 Firstly, we must consider what role is left for domestic law 
in the context of rating agency liability. Secondly, there is a broader theoretical point 
to be made in terms of the potential harm to taxonomy and, ultimately, to the rule of 
law that could be brought about by continued resort to specific, directly effective civil 
liabilities without careful consideration of the domestic context over which they 
impose themselves. 
 
It is worth considering, briefly, the background against which this debate is set. CRAs 
are, at best, perceived as having underestimated the risk inherent in much of the 
world’s debt and, at worst, are alleged to have deliberately changed rating models to 
increase the apparent credit worthiness of the booming subprime collateralised debt 
market. That is not, of course, to suggest that such action was fraudulent (despite the 
fact that, in January 2015, Standard & Poors (S&P) settled charges of fraudulent 
misconduct brought by the US Securities and Exchange Commission), though it was 
perhaps in response to market pressures.
3
 As issuers began to structure products with 
significant concentrations in one market (such as in subprime residential mortgages), 
there was considerable pressure on the CRAs to adjust their models to produce greater 
                                                        

 Teaching Fellow, Durham Law School (UK); Barrister of Lincoln’s Inn. 
1
 The Regulation, by art 8d, inserts art 35a into Regulation (EC) 1060/2009 of 16 September 2009 on 
credit rating agencies [2009] OJ L302/1, affording investors or issuers a civil claim for damages 
against CRAs, subject to certain provisions (discussed below). 
2
 I Hallak, ‘Governing Law of Sovereign Bonds and Legal Enforcement’ in R W Kolb (ed), Sovereign 
Debt: From Safety to Default (Wiley 2011) 208. 
3
 US Securities and Exchange Commission, ‘SEC Announces Charges Against Standard & Poor’s for 
Fraudulent Ratings Misconduct’ (US Securities and Exchange Commission, 21 January 2015) 
<www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-10.html> accessed 6 January 2016. 
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tranches of AAA-rated debt
4
 within investment vehicles.
5
 For example, in 2004, 
Moody’s, the second largest CRA,6 stopped using the binomial expansion ratings 
model, which favoured diversity in a portfolio, but then did not commit ‘nearly 
enough resources to get the ratings right’ to reflect changing correlative risk.7 S&P, 
similarly, were alleged not to have allocated resources to improving the analytics 
because ‘improving the model would not add to S&P’s revenues.’8  The progression 
to more issuer-friendly ratings was clearly not uncontroversial. Nevertheless, it did 
not facilitate claims against CRAs in the UK. This is because the lack of proximity 
between CRAs and investors renders a claim in negligent misstatement difficult to 
establish. This difficulty is aggravated in a claim of fraud (or deceit) because such 
claims require proof of an intention to deceive.
9
 
 
The influence of firms such as Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch was so significant that, in 
effect, they operated as gatekeepers of the debt market.
10
 By issuing a poor rating, 
they could effectively price smaller issuers out of the market. Even government-
backed liquidity schemes such as the Bank of England’s 2008 Special Liquidity 
Scheme required eligible debt to be rated AAA or equivalent by at least two of S&P, 
Moody’s, and Fitch.11 It was for similar reasons that there were only a few rating 
agencies. Due to the pressure on issuers to compete, there was little incentive to have 
their products rated by relatively small or unknown CRAs, whose ratings carried less 
gravitas than those of larger firms. In sum, the CRAs commanded considerable 
influence over a global market (involving private and state actors), which was not 
always exerted with the care or accuracy that circumstances demanded.
12
 The 
EU’sand the United States’decision to regulate the CRA market more keenly is 
thus unsurprising. 
  
                                                        
4
 AAA-rated debt are gold-standard, highest quality debt. They are the least likely to default of any 
tranches of debt.   
5
 J M Griffin and D Y Tang, ‘Did Credit Rating Agencies Make Unbiased Assumptions on CDOs?’ 
(2011) 101(3) The American Economic Review 125.  
6
 In the first half of 2007, Moody’s rated 91.2 per cent of the US asset and mortgage-backed 
securitisation market, second only to S&P. See: Asset-Backed Alert ‘Rating-Agency Shares of US 
ABS and MBS in the First Half’ (30 June 2007) < https://www.abalert.com/rankings.pl?Q=102 > 
accessed 10 May 2016. 
7
 US Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: 
Anatomy of a Financial Collapse (112 S Hrg 675) 293. 
8
 ibid 292. 
9
 Derry v Peek (1889) 14 AC 337 (HL), 374. 
10
 M Lehmann, ‘Civil Liability of Rating Agencies: An Insipid Sprout from Brussels’ (2014) LSE Law, 
Society and Economy Working Papers 15/2014, 3 
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS2014-15_Lehmann.pdf> accessed 12 January 2015; 
see also F P Hops, ‘Problems and Reforms in Mortgage-Backed Securities: Handicapping the Credit 
Rating Agencies’ (2009–2010) 79 Miss L J 531, 535. 
11
 Bank of England ‘Special Liquidity Scheme: Market Notice’ (21 April 2008) 
<www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/money/marketnotice080421.pdf> accessed 
14 February 2015. 
12
 See eg Bathurst Regional Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No 5) [2012] 
FCA 1200, in which S&P was found to have breached a duty of care to investors by awarding a AAA 
rating to a highly volatile instrument (it lost c.90 per cent of its value in fewer than 24 months). 
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1 Duplication of laws 
(a) Art 35a liability 
The background set out above does not elucidate why the regulation of CRAs 
necessitated the inclusion of a directly effective civil law action against CRAs. This 
latest Regulation (the Regulation)
13—the third of its kind since 2009—affords 
investors a private cause of action
14
 against a CRA if loss is suffered as a result of an 
agency committing, intentionally or with gross negligence, any one of over 80 
regulatory infringements, where that infringement has an impact on a credit rating. 
These infringements, listed in Annex III of the 2009 Regulation
15
 include, for 
example, a CRA’s failure to assess ‘whether there are grounds for re-rating or 
withdrawing an existing credit rating’;16 a CRA’s failure to ensure that ‘the provision 
of an ancillary service does not present a conflict of interest with its credit rating 
activity’;17 a CRA’s introduction of ‘compensation or performance evaluation 
contingent on the amount of revenue that the credit rating agency derives from the 
rated entities’;18 and a CRA’s failure to use ‘rating methodologies that are rigorous, 
systematic, continuous and subject to validation based on historical experience, 
including back-testing’.19 Put simply, these regulatory requirements aim  to ensure the 
accuracy and fairness of credit rating. 
 
It is not within the remit of this paper to analyse the regulatory requirements. The 
focus, rather, is on the imposition of additional civil liability under art 35a of the 
Regulation. It is possible to contend both that the Annex III requirements are sound 
and that the liability contingent on infringement is not. The civil liability is clearly 
dependent on some sort of factor capable of breach as provided in Annex III. 
However, those Annex III requirements do not depend on EU statutory liability for 
their relevance. For example, one could imagine the Annex III requirements forming 
a guideline for assessing, say, a breach of a standard of care in an action for negligent 
misstatement in the UK. There is also something to be said for harmonising credit 
rating practice across member states. So, to reiterate, Annex III is arguably of merit, 
and one need not disagree with that proposition in order to consider that art 35a was 
unnecessary or undesirable, or both. 
 
There are certain features of this liability that warrant consideration. Firstly, it is not 
the accuracy of the statement that triggers liability, but rather the intentional or 
grossly negligent commitment of an infringement (albeit that such an infringement 
must have ‘an impact on the credit rating’). Such an observation may appear 
unremarkable, though it will be worth bearing in mind for what follows. 
 
                                                        
13
 See above (n Error! Bookmark not defined.). 
14
 Art 35a was into Regulation (EC) 1060/2009.  
15
 Annex III was inserted into the 2009 Regulation by Regulation (EU) 513/2011 of 11 May 2011 
amending Regulation (EC) 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies [2011] OJ L145/51, art 1 para 27. 
16
 Regulation (EC) 1060/2009 (n 1) Annex III, I No 21. 
17
 ibid I No 23. 
18
 ibid I No 41. 
19
 ibid I No 43. 
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Furthermore, the infringement must, of course, require intention or gross 
negligence— mere negligence will not suffice.20 The Regulation leaves it to the 
individual member States to define the terms ‘intention’ and ‘gross negligence’. In the 
UK, gross negligence is generally understood to mean no more than negligence ‘with 
the addition of a vituperative epithet’.21 However, for the purposes of CRA liability, 
“gross negligence” has been understood to mean recklessness.22 Recklessness relates 
not to breach of a standard (as is the case of negligence), but to intention. Specifically, 
that the defendant acts recklessly with respect to: 
 
(i) a circumstance, when he is aware that a risk exists or will exist; or  
(ii) a result, when he is aware of a risk that it will occur, 
and it is, in the circumstances known to him, unreasonable to take the risk.
23
 
 
Thus, the focus of the cause of action in recklessness is different from that of 
negligent misstatement (which is concerned with the failure to meet a reasonable 
standard of care). The cause of action against a CRA will require the claimant to 
prove, at a minimum, that the CRA was careless as to the risk of infringement, not 
that they happened not to meet an objective standard of care.  
 
(b) English tort of deceit 
English private lawyers will recognise that this formulation resembles the English tort 
of deceit. Deceit consists in the making of a false statement, knowing it to be false, or 
‘recklessly, careless whether it be true or false’,24 and the claimant then acts to his or 
her detriment in reliance on it.  
 
Professor Möllers and Ms Niedorf, discussing the new Regulation, contend, however, 
that this is not deceit because deceit requires misrepresentation of fact, rather than of 
opinion.
25
 Furthermore, they contend that, in any event, the claimant will have to 
show that the defendant lacked reasonable belief in the truth of the statement, thus 
rendering any claim in the tort of deceit very unlikely.
26
 To this, a third possible 
objection could be added, ie deceit requires an intention that the claimant relies on the 
statement. In the context of ratings requested by the issuer, and made publicly 
available, such a class would either be restrictively narrow (ie, those whom the CRA 
specifically knew would act in reliance on their statement) or fancifully wide (ie, 
those who would rely on the statement, if they were they to act). 
 
However, it is respectfully submitted that such a conclusion rests on too simplistic a 
view of English tort law. For the sake of clarity, let us reiterate the alleged obstacles 
to deceit: (i) a statement of opinion cannot constitute deceit; (ii) even if the CRA was 
reckless as to a specific infringement, that is not proof that they lacked a reasonable 
                                                        
20
 Regulation (EC) 1060/2009 (n 1) art 35a para 1. 
21
 Wilson v Brett [1843] 11 M&W 113, 115 (Baron Rolfe). 
22
 HM Treasury, Explanatory Memorandum to the Credit Rating Agencies (Civil Liability) Regulations 
2013 (Cmd 1637, 2013) 7.5. 
23
 R v G [2003] UKHL 50, [41] (Lord Bingham), affirming the earlier case of R v Cunningham [1957] 
2 QB 396. 
24
 Derry v Peek (1889) 14 AC 337 (HL), 374. 
25
 T M J Möllers and C Niedorf, ‘Regulation and Liability of Credit Rating Agencies—A More 
Efficient European Law?’ (2014) 11(3) ECFR 333, 355. 
26
 ibid 356. 
This is not the final published version: please see (2016) 5(2) CJICL 363 for published version 
http://cilj.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Volume-52.pdf 
 
belief in the statement itself; and (iii) it is not at all clear, given the context in which 
CRAs operate, that reasonable bounds can be placed on the intention element. 
 
As to the first, it is submitted that a statement of opinion can, under certain 
circumstances, be regarded as a statement of fact for the purposes of tortious deceit. 
As to the second, the problem with the objection, if it relates to the law as it is, ie 
post-Annex III requirements, is that it presupposes that recklessness as to the ultimate 
truth of the statement and recklessness with regard to a necessary precursor to the 
statement are somehow discrete. As to the third, intention in English law has long 
included oblique intention, where the outcome is a virtual certainty, even if not 
directly intended,
27
 and thus concerns relating to the size of the potential class of 
claimants are misplaced. Let us consider each in turn. 
 
(i) Opinion can constitute fact  
Whilst it is true that statements of opinion do not normally constitute a statement of 
fact, numerous cases have held that a statement of opinion can—especially when it 
comes from a professional or competent party—contain within it an implicit 
representation of fact, that fact being that there are reasonable grounds for holding the 
opinion. For example, Lord Evershed MR in Brown v Raphael
28
 held that: 
 
the representation was not merely confined to the fact that the vendor 
entertained the belief but also, inescapably, there goes with it the further 
representation that he, being competently advised, had reasonable grounds 
for supporting that belief.
29
 
 
Similarly, Romer LJ, in his judgment in the same case, opined: 
 
I should have thought that it was fairly obvious that the statement 
purporting to come, as it did come, from the vendor’s solicitors, and 
expressing a belief vital in relation to this legal transaction, inevitably 
would suggest to the purchaser that the opinion was being expressed upon 
reasonable grounds; for it was a matter which everybody concerned, and 
especially a solicitor, must know would vitally affect the value of the 
reversion which the purchaser was proposing to buy (...).
30
 
 
Brown LJ in Economides v Commercial Assurance Co plc
31
 reiterated his statement 
from Brown, albeit to distinguish it, saying that the representation ‘would inevitably 
carry with it the implication that there were reasonable grounds to support the 
belief’.32 On the basis of these authorities, amongst others,33 one may at least 
conclude that opinions in professional contexts—especially where those opinions 
are vital to the transaction—carry with them an implied representation that there 
                                                        
27
 R v Woollin [1999] 1 AC 82 (HL). 
28
 Brown v Raphael [1958] Ch 636 (CA). 
29
 ibid 644. 
30
 ibid 649. 
31
 Economides v Commercial Assurance Co plc [1997] 1 QB 587 (CA). 
32
 ibid 599a. 
33
 See eg Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v Export Credit Guarantee Department [1996] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 200, 216 (Longmore J). 
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are reasonable grounds for the belief. It may, perhaps, be going too far to suggest that 
all opinions carry with them such representations, though one can comfortably assert 
that opinions from CRAs—being both professional and vital—carry with them such 
implied representations of fact. 
 
(ii) Annex III infringement renders opinions unreasonable 
In the absence of Annex III (or any specific requirements) it would be difficult to 
establish the grounds for asserting that a CRA lacked a reasonable belief in the truth 
of its statement. While not impossible, any inquiry must first establish what 
constitutes ‘reasonable grounds’, even before matters of proof are considered. The 
main benefit of the specified infringements listed in Annex III is that they can provide 
clear guidelines for determining when a rating will be reasonable (the conceit being 
that an infringement renders the rating unsound—otherwise what point is the 
requirement?). There is a sound logic in this position, as is clear when one considers 
the alternative: can the law, on the one hand, hold that a rating can be sound only if 
the agency undertaking the rating has avoided all specified infringements, while, on 
the other, stipulate that the agency can have reasonable grounds for believing its 
statement regardless of whether it avoided the infringements? Clearly not: such an 
assertion would be hopelessly inconsistent. 
 
(iii) Intention 
It is fairly settled law that, in order to succeed in a claim for deceit, the claimant needs 
to show that the defendant intended that the claimant would act on the representation 
and not, for example, that the statement was made to the claimant in particular, or that 
he would suffer harm as a result.
34
 This is important. For example, there can be no 
doubt that May LJ, in his judgment in Abu Dhabi Investment Co v H Clarkson & 
Co,
35
 was incorrect in asserting that deceit required ‘an actual intention to deceive the 
claimant’.36 Firstly, a reasonable reading of the authority cited by his Lordship does 
not support such a conclusion. The authorities are not considered in any detail in the 
judgment, but, inasmuch as they deal with the specific issue of intention at all, they 
confirm the aforementioned position—that the defendant must intend the claimant act 
on the statement.
37
 Secondly, and far more fundamentally, were this the case, then the 
tort of deceit would undermine itself, at least in instances where the defendant was 
reckless as to the truth of the statement. That is, how can one at once intend that the 
claimant actually be deceived while simultaneously not caring about the truth of the 
statement?
38
 While you may not honestly believe what you are saying, that does not 
mean you honestly believe you are lying. There is a subtle but important difference 
                                                        
34
 See eg M Jones, A Dugdale and M Simpson (eds), Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (19th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2005) paras 18–29 to 18–31; W V H Rogers (ed), Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (18th edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell 2010) para 11–11. 
35
 Abu Dhabi Investment Co v H Clarkson & Co [2008] EWCA Civ 699. 
36
 ibid [33]. 
37
 For example, in Bradford Third Equitable Benefit Building Society v Borders [1941] 2 All ER 205 
(HL), 211—a case and page specifically cited by May LJ—it was clearly stated that the false statement 
‘must be made with the intention that it should be acted upon by the plaintiff’ (Viscount Maugham); 
see also, Jones, Dugdale and Simpson (n 27)—also cited by May LJ—in which it is clearly stated that 
intention in deceit means that the defendant ‘intends that the claimant should act in reliance on [the 
false representation]’, para 18–01. 
38
 L C H Hoyano, ‘Lies, Recklessness and Deception: Disentangling Dishonesty in Civil Fraud’ (1996) 
75 Canadian Bar Review 474, 487. 
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between intending that someone act on a statement you neither know nor care is true, 
and intending for someone to believe an untruth. May LJ appears, perhaps, to have 
conflated the concepts. 
 
With that in mind, it is worth noting two important caveats. Firstly, the claimant need 
not be specifically identifiable with regard to intention; it is sufficient that the 
claimant belongs to a class of persons.
39
 Secondly, the defendant need not have 
primarily or explicitly intended that the claimant would act on the statement; it is 
sufficient that such was a virtual certainty (as noted in Woollin above). 
 
How, then, should the intention requirement be interpreted with respect to CRAs? Put 
at its most restrictive, one could argue that the defendant ought to be virtually certain 
that everyone within a class of persons would act on the basis of the statement. This 
argument has the merit of being a largely literal interpretation of the law. Thus, the 
CRA would have to know that: (a) a pool of people would act on the basis of their 
statement—not might, would; and (b) this pool of people will not necessarily include 
just those who have already chosen to invest in the relevant security but will also 
include people with whom the CRA has no legal relationship, ie, people who are still 
deciding whether to invest. However, by expanding the class to include those who 
may invest (and, by extension, who may not invest, and those who could not care less 
either way), it becomes impossible to assert that the CRA could be virtually certain 
that they would act on the basis of the statement. The literal interpretation, then, 
becomes self-defeating. 
 
A second interpretation fits more comfortably with common sense and avoids the 
logical conflict. It should be sufficient that, in making a statement, CRAs can be 
virtually certain that some people within the class will act. The sense in this 
proposition becomes apparent if we remove ourselves from the amorphous realm of 
speech. Consider this: I own a car and, in a moment of questionable judgement, 
decide to loosen significantly all of the wheel-nuts before driving down the 
motorway. That one or more of my wheels will come off is a virtual certainty; I intend 
or am at least reckless as to this outcome. That other drivers will be affected by the 
resulting disaster is also a virtual certainty, as I obliquely intend that members within 
a class (motorway users) will be affected by my action. But can I say with any 
certainty that you—as another driver and thus member of that class of motorway 
drivers—will be affected by it? Of course not. Yet were I to crash into you—and 
ignoring other relevant laws for the sake of the hypothesis—one would never wish to 
deny your claim for damages simply because I had not intended that you would be 
affected. Indeed, it would have been wholly unrealistic for me to suppose that all 
members of the class would be affected; the fact that it is only one member of that 
class who was affected should not diminish my liability to that member. And so it is 
with deceit. 
 
Thus, a CRA can be held to have intended that a claimant would act on the rating, on 
the proviso that the claimant belongs to that class of persons who are virtually certain 
to act on the basis of a rating. It is, for example, difficult to see why professional 
investors ought not to be regarded as such a class. To those more used to the realm of 
                                                        
39
 Abu Dhabi Investment Co (n 28). 
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negligence, this net seems to be cast very wide; absent the limiting factor of 
proximity, we seem left with something more closely resembling reasonable 
foreseeability. Though, of course, this is not negligence. There would seem very little 
reason for limiting liability in fraud to similar extents. 
 
What has been established, then, is that the current English tort of deceit, fortified by 
Annex III, achieves at least as much as the art 35a civil law action. CRAs are 
professional, often privy to information inaccessible to others, and thus their opinions 
carry with them an implied representation that there are reasonable grounds for 
holding those opinions, and this places it squarely within the purview of the law on 
deceit. Such an observation may appear trifling—on its own, it probably would be—
but it is demonstrative of a quick-fix approach to law that is troubling, as shall be 
demonstrated in the following sections. 
 
2 Taxonomic objections 
(a) Specific conflicts in CRA liability 
One of the fundamental problems with duplication of laws actually arises from 
inexact duplication. This is the problem here. Article 35a(1) states that: 
 
An investor may claim damages under this Article where it establishes that 
it has reasonably relied (...) on a credit rating for a decision to invest into, 
hold onto or divest from a financial instrument covered by that credit 
rating. 
 
Taken on its own terms, the requirement is not without possible justification: one 
suspects that the requirement of reasonable reliance is partly to ensure that investors 
are not at liberty to make risky investments effectively underwritten by the CRAs. 
That being said, the requirement of reasonable reliance does seem out of place in an 
article concerned with intentional or grossly negligent infringement.
40
 However, there 
exists no such requirement in tortious deceit. All that is required in this respect is that 
the claimant relied on the statement, not that the reliance was in any way reasonable. 
The claimant’s own lack of care may be a defence to a claim in negligence, but it does 
not apply to deceit.
41
  
 
This leaves the current law in something of a quandary: if art 35a is to sit alongside 
domestic law, then whatever justification the reasonableness requirement may have, it 
is undone by basic civil fraud. This may not be true in all member states, of course; 
however, if that is the case, then there are obvious implications for harmonisation. 
This would not be a problem if the sole objective of art 35a were to impose a 
minimum standard of protection, a proposition that is admittedly not without some 
precedent. Arden LJ, in respect of conflicts between the UK’s Equal Pay Act 1970 
and art 141 of the European Union Treaty in Wilson v Health and Safety Executive,
42
 
                                                        
40
 There is a general requirement in private law that the parties be viewed as equal—see, for example, 
E Weinrib, Corrective Justice (OUP 2012)—which is respected by recognising the contributory 
negligence of the claimant; to ignore one party’s negligence in favour of the other’s is clearly unjust. It 
is not so clear to me that the scales are so equally weighted where one party commits a wrong 
tantamount to fraud and the other party only commits negligence. 
41
 Central Ry of Venezuela v Kisch (1867) LR 2 HL 99. 
42
 [2009] EWCA Civ 1074 (CA). 
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noted that Community law does not prevent member states from conferring greater 
rights to equal pay.
43
 Therefore, so long as domestic law affords protection that is at 
least equivalent to that offered under Community law, it will be compatible with 
Community law. The analogous reasoning works inasmuch as both the Treaty and art 
35a liability afford protection by the grant of rights, ie the English law on deceit can 
be compatible with the Regulation if it affords greater protection to investors than the 
Regulation. However, the equal pay protection afforded under the Treaty is based 
on—and a logical corollary of—a core, foundational principle of the Community that 
prevents comparable situations being treated differently without justification.
44
 The 
Regulation is more removed from this tight logical relationship, and is less obviously 
based on a single principle against which we can judge the compatibility of national 
law. For example, domestic law could be judged to promote equal pay more 
effectively than specific Community laws, and thus still be compatible with art 141. 
In this context, one cannot make a relevant argument that domestic law promotes 
investor protection more effectively than the Regulation, because the Regulation’s 
explicit objective is regulation of CRAs, and not investor protection—even if the 
latter is the overriding rationale. If harmonisation is a principle on which the 
Regulation is based, then such will be of little comfort to those seeking to promote 
better protection through domestic law. 
 
In the alternative, then, we must consider that the Regulation supersedes domestic 
laws of deceit, at least in respect of CRAs, on the basis that tortious deceit conflicts 
with one of the substantive provisions of the Regulation (and who is to say that art 
35a(1) concerning reasonable reliance is any less substantive than the rest of art 
35a?). Such would, of course, be the traditional interpretation of Regulations.
45
 It 
seems particularly odd for the rules on fraud to be altered in a contingent manner, and 
yet more odd for CRAs to receive greater protection from claims arising from their 
own fraudulent acts than is afforded to those whose fraud may cause less systemic 
harm, viz. every other legal person under that governing law. The Council probably 
did not consider that this liability amounted to fraud in the first place, but such an 
observation does not change the fact that it does so in England & Wales, nor does it 
help solve the conundrum. Such conflicts are bound to occur again in other guises, so 
long as quick-fix solutions are found in directly effective specific civil actions, 
imposed upon otherwise long and carefully considered law. This is not wanton 
criticism; it is a fact. 
 
(b) General theoretical considerations 
Bizarre though this situation may be, there is a sense in which we are where we are, 
for now at least. In the final part of this paper, it is apt briefly to consider some of the 
more theoretical aspects of this problem, if only as a guide for future decision-
making. 
  
Of the many possible defining characteristics of the rule of law, few can be so certain 
as the requirement that the law must be accessible and intelligible to those who would 
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fall within its purview. Accessibility would require that the law does not regulate the 
same wrong—the term ‘wrong’ is used in the sense of a legal category, rather than 
merely meaning the same ‘act’—under different regulatory regimes. We accept, of 
course, that certain actions may violate a number of different principles: a breach of 
contract may violate contractual and tortious principles, just as a criminal act may 
generate both criminal and civil liability. But one may rightly question a law that 
regulates varyingly an act violating just one legal principle. Similarly, for the law to 
be intelligible, it must, inter alia, be possessed of internal consistency, of a unity of 
meaning; if the law is to be a creature of reason, then internal contradictions are 
certainly a sign of misunderstanding or poor reasoning, and thus to be avoided. For 
example, it is a troubling oddity of the English (and not just English) common law 
that fraud ‘vitiates all transactions known to the law’46—except, of course, where that 
fraud relates to inducement to engage in sexual activity, where, save in certain 
exceptional circumstances, consent to sex will not be vitiated by fraud.
47
 This is not to 
argue that the law is to become slave to language, but evidently there is not a clear 
understanding of some element of—in this example—either fraud, or consent, or rape 
law. Fundamentally, the law, if it is to be fair, must be consistent; if it is to be 
consistent, it must eschew flawed taxonomy and internal contradiction. 
The aforementioned golden thread is important for understanding any system of law. 
Just as we may ask what makes dogs and wolves different enough to be of different 
subspecies, but similar enough to be of the same species, we may ask what marks the 
essential difference between negligence occasioning physical harm and negligence 
occasioning economic loss; or—conversely—what, despite evident differences, 
unifies them when compared with, say, contract law. The example is not wanton. Tort 
law in England has developed in a piecemeal fashion, and, despite notable attempts to 
find irreducible core elements, remains largely diffuse.
48
 There is something to be 
said for pragmatism over formalism, of course, but there will come a point at which 
pragmatism must yield to the requirement that like cases be treated alike. It is clearly 
not enough simply to assert that ‘tort is the realm of legal wrongs’, and thereafter list 
the many and various wrongs that constitute tort. One needs to ask what is meant by 
wrong that makes tortious wrongs different from, say, criminal wrongs or—more 
pertinently for private law—from the ‘wrong’ of breach of contract, and also to ask 
what it is that entitles torts to belong to the same taxonomic group beyond merely 
asserting that they don’t belong in a different taxonomic group (what, for example, 
unites defamation and negligent misstatement?). This is not to say that there are not 
some answers to these questions—and certainly this paper is not the forum to consider 
them all—but it is important that we ask the questions; without clear taxonomic 
understanding, we cannot hope to decide like cases alike. 
 
Perhaps these considerations speak for themselves, but it should be abundantly clear 
that a growing archipelago of small islands of liability from the EU—albeit that EU 
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law is in a different but overlapping legal taxonomy—can only serve to obfuscate and 
to sever nascent golden threads. They render illusory any coherence in our law, which 
‘is liable to be affected whether the basic approach of some area of law is changed or 
whether some ill-fitting and largely unnecessary principles are superimposed on to 
it’.49 It would be one thing if those islands of liability were addressing gaps in the 
national law—and no doubt some do and will—though, as has been shown herein, 
this is not always the case. 
 
3 Concluding remarks 
Though much of the CRA regulatory regime that now exists in the EU is to be 
commended, as it provides guidelines vital to ensuring long-term confidence (if not 
stability) in the potent debt markets, the creation of directly effective liability remains 
both a mystery and a problem. Why the same could not have been achieved through a 
Directive is confounding. The end result is near duplication of tortious deceit in 
England and Wales—fraud, by any other name—except it did not even manage exact 
duplication (in the matter of reasonable reliance). Accordingly, where there would 
have been mere confusion, there is now genuine conflict, a conflict that seems to 
resolve itself by affording CRAs greater protection against liability for fraud than is 
afforded to any other actor. Whilst the final subsection in this paper may have seemed 
somewhat removed from the rest of the discussion, given that art 35a is already with 
us, it is in many respects the most important. For as long as we classify our private 
law by causative events—like unjust enrichment, or breach of contract, or deceit—we 
must never allow ourselves to fail to understand that causative event, lest we lose 
sight of what makes those whom we make liable actually liable. The quick-fix civil 
liability in the Regulation takes us one further step into the morass of ill-defined and 
inconsistent private liabilities. 
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